By embracing the cloud computing paradigm enterprises are able to realise significant cost savings whilst boosting their agility and productivity. Yet, due mainly to security and privacy concerns, many enterprises are reluctant to migrate the storage and processing of their critical assets to the cloud. One way to alleviate these concerns, hence bolster the adoption of cloud computing, is to infuse suitable access control policies in cloud services. Nevertheless, the complexity inherent in such policies, stemming from the dynamic nature of cloud environments, calls for a framework capable of providing assurances with respect to the effectiveness of these policies. The work presented in this paper elaborates on such a framework. In particular, it proposes an approach for generically checking potential subsumption relations between access control policies that incorporate the contextual knowledge that characterises an access request and which needs to be taken into account for granting, or denying, the request. The proposed framework is expressed ontologically hence enabling automated reasoning, through semantic inferencing, about policy subsumption.
INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing signifies a shift towards servicebased architectures that offer a theoretically boundless scalability and a flexible pay-per-use model (Liu et al., 2011) . Such a shift induces significant advantages for enterprises in terms of cost, flexibility and business agility. In particular, it enables inherently heterogeneous stakeholders, ranging from SMEs to large retailers and healthcare institutions, to realise significant cost savings by migrating their data and applications to servers that are under the control of third-party cloud providers. However, relinquishing control of -oftentimes critical-corporate assets naturally raises significant security concerns that deter, in general, stakeholders from embracing the cloud paradigm (CSA, 2015) .
One way to alleviate these concerns, hence reinforce the adoption of cloud computing, is to infuse adequate access control policies into the applications through which critical assets are accessed in the cloud . Nevertheless, the inherently dynamic nature of cloud environments calls for policies that are able to incorporate a potentially complex body of contextual knowledge (Veloudis et al., 2017) .
We argue that, for stakeholders to be able to rely on such complex policies for the protection of their sensitive assets, a generic governance framework that is capable of providing assurances about the effectiveness of the policies is required . Our work, conducted as part of the PaaSword project (Paa, 2015) , provides such a framework. In particular, it provides a governance mechanism that draws upon a semantic representation of policies, one that captures ontologically the various knowledge artefacts comprised in policies, and therefore unravels the expression of policies from the actual code of the applications into which they are infused. This renders our mechanism capable of providing automated reasoning about potential inter-policy relations, such as subsumption and contradiction, that may affect the effectiveness of the policies. This paper presents an approach to reasoning about subsumption relations between complex context-aware access control policies. The approach draws upon the diffused XACML standard (XAC, 2013) , whilst it performs inter-policy comparisons, aiming at unveiling subsumption relations, on the basis of a suitable semantic characterisation of all those access requests that may be permitted, or denied, by the policies. One of the main benefits of our approach is that, by modelling policies ontologically -using OWL (OWL, 2004)-we can delegate reasoning about policy subsumption to off-theshelf DL reasoners. In addition, our approach enables -by virtue of semantic inferencing-the generation of new knowledge artefacts which potentially allows the detection of subsumption relations in situations in which the knowledge artefacts encoded in the policies are syntactically incomparable.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 proposes an ontological representation of an XACML-based model for policies and provides an ontological representation for access requests. Section 3 articulates a semantic characterisation of the conditions under which a policy is enforceable upon an access request. Section 4 outlines an approach to determining subsumption between policies and policy sets. Finally, Section 5 presents related work and Section 6 conclusions.
ACCESS CONTROL POLICIES AND REQUESTS
Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) policies (Hu et al., 2014) , due to their inherent generality stemming from their reliance on the generic concept of an attribute, are deemed particularly suitable for capturing such knowledge and are therefore adopted in our work.
Representing Attributes
The Context Model (CM) proposed in (Verginadis et al., 2015) provides a suitable ontological framework for the representation of the various knowledge artefacts, or attributes, associated with access requests, hence with access control policies. At the core of the model is the class ContextAttributes which, as its name suggests, encompasses concepts that represent contextual attributes such as the physical or network location from which a request originates, the chronological point -or interval-that may characterise the action associated with a request, as well as information pertaining to the connection (e.g. which cipher suite is utilised) -or type of device (e.g. desktop, smart phone, etc.)-used for issuing a request.
Other attributes include the subjects and objects of requests, which are represented as instances of the classes Sub ject and Ob ject respectively, are are associated with the contextual attributes that characterise them through the object property associatedWith. A request also incorporates an action (e.g. a read, write or execute action) which is represented as an instance of the class Action. For more details on the CM, the interested is referred to (Verginadis et al., 2015) 
ABAC Policy Model
Following the XACML standard (XAC, 2013) , an ABAC policy comprises one or more ABAC rules. Rules are the most elementary structural elements and the basic building blocks of policies. In this respect, they are the carriers of the core logic that dwells in policies. Each ABAC rule consists of an antecedent and a consequent. The former articulates a (pre-)condition (or 'target' in the XACML jargon) that must be satisfied in order for the rule to be enforceable. More specifically, it incorporates a set of relevant knowledge artefacts, its so-called attributes, that are captured in terms of the concepts introduced by the CM, and whose values need to be taken into account when deciding whether to permit, or deny, a particular request. On the other hand, the consequent of an ABAC rule captures the decision associated with the rule; such a decision invariably resolves to either a 'permit' or a 'deny'. An ABAC policy is also invariably linked to a rule-combining algorithm (XAC, 2013) that determines which one of the policy's rules (if any) is to be applied when responding to an access request. It follows that, for each access request, an ABAC policy resolves to at most one of its constituent rules; a policy that does not resolve to any of its constituent rules for a particular request is considered 'NotApplicable' for that request.
ABAC policies may also be grouped into ABAC policy sets which potentially comprise, in addition to policies, other policy sets as well. Each ABAC policy set is linked to a policy-combining algorithm (XAC, 2013) that determines which one of its elements (if any) is to be enforced when responding to a particular access request.
Ontological Representation
Our ontological representation of the ABAC policy model comprises four main concepts 1 : Policy, Rule, PolicySet and CombiningAlg (see Figure 1) . Evidently, instances of these concepts represent, respectively, ABAC policies, ABAC rules, ABAC policy sets and combining algorithms (both rule-and policybased ones). As depicted in Figure 1 , each ABAC policy and policy set is associated, via the property 1 All concepts and properties of the ABAC policy model belong to the pac namespace (Veloudis and Paraskakis, 2015) ; in order to avoid notational clutter, we omit the pac prefix from concept and property identifiers. hasCombAlg, with exactly one combining algorithm, and each ABAC rule is associated, via the properties hasAnt and hasCons, with exactly one antecedent and exactly one consequent respectively; the consequent invariably evaluates to one of the individuals permit or deny.
Our ontological representation also includes the concepts OrderedRule and OrderedElement (see Figure 1 ). These are intended to capture the particular order that the creator of a policy, or of a policy set, imposes upon the rules of a policy, or upon the elements of a policy set; they are also intended to capture the precedence that these rules, or elements, enjoy during their enforcement upon an access request. More specifically, as depicted in Figure 1 , each instance of the concept OrderedRule is associated, through the property hasRule, with exactly one ABAC rule and, through each of the properties hasOrder and hasPrecedence, with exactly one non-negative integer that indicates that rule's order and precedence respectively in a containing policy. The OrderedElement concept comprises two kinds of element: ordered policies and ordered policy sets. An ordered policy is associated, through the property hasPolicy, with exactly one ABAC policy; it is also associatedwith the same properties as above-with two nonnegative integers that represent the policy's order and precedence. Similarly, an ordered policy set is associated, through the property hasPolicySet, with exactly one (nested) ABAC policy set and, through the same properties as above, with two non-negative integers that represent that policy set's order and precedence. An ABAC policy is associated with its constituent ordered rules through the property hasOrderedRule (see Figure 1) , whilst an ordered ABAC policy, or an ordered policy set, is associated with its encompassing policy set(s) through the property hasSet.
The ontological model outlined above is formally articulated in terms of terminological (TBox) and assertional (ABox) axioms expressed in the SR OI Q Description Logic 2 (DL) (Horrocks et al., 2006) .
Delving into the Antecedent of an ABAC Rule
Below we elaborate on constraints regarding the attributes embodied in the antecedent of an ABAC rule. The first constraint states that the antecedent must embody exactly one protected asset. Ontologically, this is captured by demanding that each instance of the concept Antecedent is associated with exactly one individual from the class Ob ject of the CM, and that this association should be realised through the object property hasOb j (see Figure 1 ). The second constraint articulates that each ABAC rule must be associated with exactly one action from the class Action (i.e. with exactly one action that is to be performed on the protected asset), and that this association should be realised through the property hasAct (see Figure  1 ). The third constraint states that each ABAC rule must be associated with at least one subject (either human or machine) from the class Sub ject (i.e. with at least one entity requesting access to the protected asset), and that this association should be realised through the property hasSub j. Finally, the fourth constraint demands that each ABAC rule refers to at most one context expression -i.e. to at most one expres-sion that constrains the values of the contextual attributes that pertain to an access request-and that this association should be realised through the property hasCE. Context expressions are further elaborated below. A context expression (CE) is a propositional logic formula that articulates the contextual conditions that must hold in order to permit, or deny, a request. Such conditions may refer to the subject and/or object of a request, or to the request itself. Ontologically, a CE is represented as an instance of the class ContextExpr (see Figure 1) . The various attributes that it binds, i.e. its parameters, are represented as instances of the classes encompassed by the CM. These parameters are associated with their encompassing CE through the object property hasParam and may be combined through the usual propositional logic connectives. A CE invariably enjoys at least one association with a parameter through the property hasParam. Moreover, a CE may be defined recursively, in terms of one or more other CEs; this is captured by including the class ContextExpr in both the domain and the range of the property hasParam. A CE is attached to the entity that it refers to through the object property re f ersTo. As an example, consider a CE identified by the individual e that articulates that the subject s resides either in the physical location identified as 'EU', or in the network location identified by the subnet 144.0.0.0/8.
Ontologically, such a CE is expressed in SR OI Q as follows 3 :
Access Requests
Similar to the antecedent of an ABAC rule, an access request may embody attributes that specify the particular protected asset that it targets (i.e. its object), the action that it attempts to perform on that object, its subject, as well as a context expression that reflects the relevant contextual circumstances under which it is issued. Ontologically, an access request is represented as an instance of a concept named Request; it is associated with its attributes through the same properties as the ones used for associating ABAC rule antecedents with their attributes, namely: hasOb j, hasAct, hasSub j and hasCE.
DETERMINING ABAC RULE ENFORCEABILITY
Reasoning about the enforceability of an ABAC rule upon an access request is a crucial part of our mechanism for determining inter-policy relations. This section outlines how such reasoning is performed. An ABAC rule r is enforceable upon an access request q iff q entails r's antecedent, i.e. iff r's antecedent is semantically inferable from q. As an example, let r's antecedent enjoy exactly one association, via the properties hasOb j, hasAct, hasSub j and hasCE, with the individuals o, w, s and e respectively. e represents the CE of assertion 1 of Section 2.3.1. Suppose now that the request q is associated, via the same properties, with the individuals o, w, s and e respectively. e represents a CE that conveys the fact that s resides in, say, the city of Athens. r is enforceable on q as: (i) q is associated with the individuals o, w, s as demanded by r; (ii) e entails e -an entailment that is based upon semantic inferencing that generates the knowledge that the city of Athens is indeed located in the EU.
Evidently, determining the enforceability of a rule on an access request may entail semantic inferencing in the CM. For such inferencing to be possible, however, certain knowledge artefacts must be encoded in the CM. For instance, in the example above, the concept PhyLocation needs to include such concepts as Area, Country and City, along with the appropriate instances; it also needs to include the transitive property isLocatedIn that interrelates these instances 4 .
We are now ready to outline our approach for determining the enforceability of a rule r upon an access request q. Firstly, we programmatically construct an abstract OWL class that comprises all those individuals that could, potentially, play the role of r's antecedent. Such an abstract class, call it A r , includes all those individuals that are associated, through the appropriate properties, with certain attribute instances from the CM. For instance, going back to the example above, A r takes the form (in SR OI Q ):
where 5 C is the abstract class of assertion 1 of Section 4 These concepts, instances and properties are introduced during the process of priming the CM -a process undertaken by the stakeholders who adopt our framework and aims at tailoring the CM to suit their particular purposes.
5 For any object property P and concept C, (= 1P.C) represents the abstract class that comprises all those individuals that feature exactly one association through P with an 2.3. Secondly, the same process is followed for constructing an abstract class, call it R q , that comprises all those individuals that may potentially play the role of the request q.
The rule r is enforceable upon q iff R q is a subclass of A r , i.e. iff R q A r . The validity of this subclass relation is automatically assessed through the use of the Pellet reasoner (Sirin et al., 2007) (although any other DL reasoner could have been used instead).
RULE, POLICY AND POLICY SET SUBSUMPTION 4.1 Rule Subsumption
For any two ABAC rules r 1 and r 2 , r 1 is subsumed by r 2 iff r 1 and r 2 are associated with the same decision and r 2 is enforceable on any access request on which r 1 is enforceable. Clearly, for this to be possible, the abstract class of all individuals that could potentially play the role of the antecedent of r 1 must be a subclass of the corresponding class of all individuals that could potentially play the role of the antecedent of r 2 , i.e. A r 1 A r 2 , where A r 1 and A r 2 are constructed as outlined in Section 3. For instance, consider the rule r of the example of Section 3 and let r be another rule whose antecedent enjoys -through the properties hasOb j, hasAct and hasSub j-exactly the same associations as r's antecedent (i.e. with the individuals o, w and s respectively); also, let the antecedent of r be associated, through the property hasCE, with an individual e that represents a CE that demands that s resides in, say, Greece -formally:
As long as r and r are associated with the same decision, r subsumes r for the former is enforceable on any request that the latter is: any request that originates from Greece (as demanded by the latter) also originates from the EU or the subnet 144.0.0.0/8 (as demanded by the former). In other words, semantic inferencing allows us to conclude that the abstract class appearing in assertion 3 above is a subclass of the abstract class appearing in assertion 1. Rule subsumption may be automatically determined by a DL reasoner.
instance of C; it is an abbreviation for the SR OI Q notation (≤ 1 P.C) (≥ 1 P.C).
Policy Subsumption
Determining whether one ABAC policy is subsumed by another requires consideration of the precedence values possessed by the rules of these policies; these values are assigned on the basis of the rule-combining algorithm associated with each of the policies. For any two rules r 1 and r 2 of a policy p, r 2 takes precedence over r 1 , denoted r 1 < p r 2 , iff the precedence value associated with r 1 in p (see Section 2.3) is lesser than the precedence value associated with r 2 in p. Let us now briefly outline how precedence values are assigned to rules on the basis of rule-combining algorithms.
Rule-combining Algorithms
In (XAC, 2013), the following rule-combining algorithms are defined: 'deny overrides' (DO), 'permit overrides' (PO) and 'first applicable' (FA). The DO algorithm imposes the following precedence on p's ruleset S p : (i) all 'deny' rules (if any) are assigned an equal precedence; (ii) all 'permit' rules (if any) are assigned an equal precedence; (iii) any 'deny' rule is assigned higher precedence than any 'permit' rule. Entirely symmetrical precedence values are imposed by the PO algorithm: (i) all 'permit' rules (if any) are assigned an equal precedence; (ii) all 'deny' rules (if any) are assigned an equal precedence; (iii) any 'permit' rule is assigned higher precedence than any 'deny' rule. Finally, the case of the FA algorithm is quite different for it does not impose by itself any precedence on S p : instead, it relies on the order imposed by p's creator through the hasOrder property (see Section 2.3).
Propagating Access Control Decisions to the Policy Level
We now determine how access control decisions are propagated from the rule level to the policy level. For an access request q to invoke the decision v from p (where v ::= permit|deny), the following conditions must conjunctively hold. Firstly, there must exist a non-empty subset of S p , say S p,v , that solely comprises rules that yield the decision v, formally: S p,v = {r ∈ S p |C r ≡ {v}} where C r is the class that represents r's consequent. Secondly, at least one of these rules must be enforceable on q. In other words, the abstract class R q must be a subclass of the union of all the abstract classes A r where r ∈ S p,v ; formally, R q r∈S p,v A r . Thirdly, there must exist a rule r in S p,v that is enforceable on q such that no other rule (if any) that yields a decision different than v and has a precedence higher than r is enforceable on q. In other words, none of the rules that belong to the set H p,v,r = {r ∈ S p |C r ≡ {v} ∧ r < p r } must be enforceable on q for otherwise one of these rules would be enforced on q yielding a decision different than v (v represents here the opposite decision than v). It follows that the class of all requests for which p yields the decision v, denoted R p,v , is defined by the following assertion:
Note that, for any abstract class C, the notation ¬C denotes the complement of C, i.e. the class of all individuals that are not instances of C.
Determining Policy Subsumption
A policy p 1 is considered to be subsumed by a policy p 2 with respect to the decision v, iff the class of all requests for which p 1 yields the decision v is subsumed by the class of all requests for which p 2 yields v, i.e. iff R p 1 ,v v R p 2 ,v ; p 1 is considered to be subsumed by a policy p 2 , denoted R p 1 R p 2 , iff p 1 is subsumed by p 2 for both values of v. Policy subsumption may be automatically determined by a DL reasoner.
Redundant Rules
In addition to reasoning about policy subsumption, our mechanism may also detect any redundant rules in S p . A rule r is redundant iff it is never enforced on any access request. This occurs when the antecedent of at least one rule from S p that has higher precedence than r subsumes the antecedent of r; formally: A r {r ∈S p,v |r< p r } A r .
Policy Set Subsumption
We turn now our attention to defining subsumption between ABAC policy sets. Recall from Section 2.3 that a policy set may comprise both policies and/or nested policy sets. Let S ps = {e i |i ∈ [1..n]} be the elements of a policy set ps. Determining subsumption between policy sets entails consideration of the precedence values possessed by the elements of these sets, hence of the policy-combining algorithms associated with them. For any two elements e 1 , e 2 ∈ S ps , e 2 takes precedence over e 1 in ps, denoted e 1 < ps e 2 , iff the precedence value associated with e 1 in ps is lesser than the precedence value associated with e 2 . Let us briefly outline how precedence values are assigned to elements of policy sets on the basis of policycombining algorithms.
Policy-combining Algorithms
In (XAC, 2013), the following policy-combining algorithms are defined: 'deny overrides', 'permit overrides', 'first applicable' and 'only one applicable' (OOA). The DO and PO algorithms, as opposed to their rule-based counterparts, do not assign any particular precedence values on the elements of a policy set. Turning now to the FA algorithm, this is similar to its rule-based counterpart: the precedence values assigned to the elements of a policy set coincide with the order of these elements as this has been defined by the creator of the policy set. Finally, the OOA algorithm ensures that exactly one element of a policy set is applicable to a request and responds to that request with that element's decision; if two or more elements are applicable, an 'Indeterminate' decision is returned, whereas if no elements are applicable, the decision is 'NotApplicable'. As we would expect, the OOA algorithm does not impose any precedence to the elements of a policy set.
Propagating Access Control Decisions to the Policy Set Level
We now determine how access control decisions are propagated to the policy set level. Let R CA ps,v denote the class of all requests that invoke the decision v from a policy set ps, where CA::=DO|PO|FA|OOA. The fact that some combining algorithms do not assign precedence values to policy set elements precludes the provision of a single assertion, analogous to assertion 4 of Section 4.2.2, that characterises all requests that may be permitted, or denied, by a policy set without taking into account the combining algorithm associated with that policy set. We thus consider each policy-combining algorithm in turn; initially we focus on policy sets that only comprise policies.
Deny Overrides and Permit Overrides. We start with the DO algorithm. The class of all access requests for which ps yields a 'deny' decision is defined as:
These are effectively all requests which cause at least one element of S ps to yield a 'deny' decision. Similarly, the class of all requests for which ps yields a 'permit' decision is defined as: These are effectively all requests which cause one or more elements of S ps to yield a 'permit', but not a 'deny', decision. The case of the PO algorithm is entirely analogous. The class of all access requests for which ps yields a 'permit' decision is defined as:
Similarly, the class of all requests for which ps yields a 'deny' decision is defined as:
First Applicable. The class of all access requests for which ps yields v is defined as:
e ∈S ps ∧e< ps e R e ,v )
These are effectively all requests which cause an element e in S ps to yield v without causing any element e in ps with a precedence higher than e to yield a decision different than v (denoted asv).
Only One Applicable. The class of all access requests for which ps yields the decision v is defined as:
e ∈S ps ∧e =e (R e ,deny R e ,permit )) (10) These are effectively all requests which cause exactly one element in S ps to yield v.
The class R CA ps,v may be generalised to policy sets that potentially comprise nested policy sets as follows: the class R e,v in assertions 5-10 above is replaced by a construct X e,v which evaluates to R e,v if e is a policy, and to R CA e,v if e is a policy set where CA is the combining algorithm associated with e.
Determining Policy Set Subsumption
We are now ready to define subsumption between policy sets. A policy set ps 1 is considered to be subsumed by a policy set ps 2 with respect to the decision v, iff the class of all requests for which ps 1 yields the decision v is subsumed by the class of all requests for which ps 2 yields the decision v, i.e. iff R 
RELATED WORK
The work reported in (Kolovski et al., 2007 ) presents a formalisation of XACML using DLs. Similar to our work, it proposes an approach to reasoning about subsuming policies based on a semantic characterisation of the class of access requests for which these policies emit identical decisions. Nevertheless, as opposed to our work, it fails to provide an underlying ontological model for rules, policies and policy sets. This entails the following disadvantages. Firstly, it fails to explicitly model combining algorithms, hence the precedence that they impose on policies and policy sets. To overcome this problem, the work in (Kolovski et al., 2007) employs a formalism alien to OWL, namely Defeasible DLs (DDLs), for capturing precedence implicitly. Nevertheless, such an approach incurs the overhead of reducing provability in DDLs to concept satisfiability in OWL; in addition, as the authors concede, it hinders the expression of certain combining algorithms such as the OOA algorithm. Secondly, it fails to model the potentially complex contextual knowledge that may be associated with rules and thus precludes the performance of semantic inferencing for detecting subsumption between rule attributes, in particular between CEs. This is clearly a drawback in dynamic cloud environments.
On a different note, a number of approaches have been proposed for semantically representing policies (Uszok et al., 2004; Kagal et al., 2003; Nejdl et al., 2005) . These generally rely on OWL (OWL, 2004) for capturing the various knowledge artefacts that reside in policies. In (Uszok et al., 2004) KaoS is presented -a generic framework offering: (i) a human interface layer for the expression of policies; (ii) a policy management layer that is capable of resolving conflicting policies; (iii) a monitoring and enforcement layer that encodes policies in a programmatic format suitable for enforcing them. KaoS lacks any mechanism for explicitly reasoning about subsuming relations between access control policies.
In (Kagal et al., 2003) Rei is proposed: a framework for specifying, analyzing and reasoning about policies. Similar to our work, a policy comprises a list of rules that take the form of OWL properties; it also comprises a context that defines the underlying policy domain. Rei resorts to the use of constructs adopted from rule-based programming languages for the definition of policy rules. This essentially prevents Rei from exploiting the full inferencing potential of OWL as policy rules are expressed in a formalism external to OWL. In addition, it does not provide any mechanism for reasoning about subsumption in access control policies.
In (Nejdl et al., 2005 ) the authors propose POLI-CYTAB for facilitating trust negotiation in Semantic Web environments. POLICYTAB adopts ontologies for the representation of policies that guide a trust negotiation process ultimately aiming at granting, or denying, access to sensitive Web resources. These policies essentially specify the credentials that an entity must possess in order to carry out an action on a sensitive resource that is under the ownership of another entity. Nevertheless, no attempt is made to semantically model the context associated with access requests, rendering POLICYTAB inadequate for the dynamic nature of cloud environments.
CONCLUSIONS
We have presented an approach to reasoning about subsumption between access control policies in dynamic cloud environments. The reasoning is based on a semantic characterisation of all those access requests to which the policies respond in an identical manner, whilst it is performed automatically through semantic inferencing that is carried out by off-theshelf reasoners. As part of future work we intend to perform further performance tests in order to more accurately determine the scalability of our approach to larger underlying CMs. In addition, we intend to incorporate our approach in an editor that we are currently developing for facilitating the construction of ABAC rules, policies and policy sets. This way, each time a new rule, policy or policy set is created, the editor will determine whether it is subsumed by an existing rule, policy or policy set and thus assist developers in devising effective access control policies and policy sets.
